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Abstract 
We find evidence that households in Slovakia do benefit from 
the ECB asset purchase programme. On the individual bank-
level data of 26 financial institutions (full representation of the 
banking sector) we establish and confirm a traditional 
relationship between bank lending and changes to deposit ratio. 
We find the long-run relationship to be twice as strong in the 
household sector as in the sector of non-financial corporations. 
Controlling for interest rate changes and other factors, we also 
introduce asset purchases into the model. We document some, 
although limited, evidence of the presence of the bank lending 
channel of asset purchases in the household sector.  
  
 
4 
DID QUANTITATIVE EASING BOOST BANK LENDING?  
THE SLOVAK EXPERIENCE. 
INTRODUCTION 
In early 2015 the ECB joined several major central banks in implementing a 
programme of large scale asset (predominantly government bonds) purchases, 
commonly referred to as quantitative easing, or QE.3 This programme is coordinated 
by the ECB, but conducted in a decentralised fashion whereby each national central 
bank focuses on its domestic market. In this respect Slovakia belongs to a group of 
countries where local banks have the highest holdings of domestic government 
bonds (see Figure 1). Since banks are expected to play a central role in the 
transmission of these purchases, in this paper we are looking for the presence of a 
lending channel of these purchases. 
Figure 1. Banks’ domestic government bond holdings 
 
Note: Domestic government bond portfolio measured as percentage of total 
banks’ assets. Average figures over the QE implementation period.  
From the start of the programme in March 2015 until April 2017, the National Bank 
of Slovakia (NBS) and the ECB purchased €9.3 billion of Slovak government bonds, 
which compares to 7.7% of national GDP.4 The vast majority of Slovak government 
debt is held by banks and a minority by insurance corporations and pension funds. In 
                                           
3 On 22 January 2015, the Governing Council of the ECB announced that it would implement the 
public sector purchase programme (PSPP) in order to address the risks of a too prolonged period of 
low inflation.  
4 The NBS has purchased public sector securities which amount to 27% of overall government debt. 
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theory, when the NBS purchases government securities either from a commercial 
bank or a non-bank, it leaves this institution with two options in terms of what to do 
with reserves obtained.5 First, an institution may use reserves to purchase other 
assets and thus reallocate its portfolios, for example towards corporate bonds and/or 
equity. The literature refers to this as a portfolio rebalancing channel (PRC). Or, 
second, since excess reserves are currently remunerated with a negative rate of 
interest, a commercial bank may benefit from an expansion of lending to the real 
economy, and thus use the bank lending channel (BLC).  
There is now a large and growing body of literature that discusses these transmission 
channels. For example, empirical evidence in support of the portfolio rebalancing 
channel has been found in studies for the euro area (e.g. Andrade et al., 2016), the 
United Kingdom (e.g. Joyce et al., 2014), for the United States (e.g. Carpenter et al., 
2015), and for Japan (e.g. Hogen and Saito, 2014). The effects of large asset 
purchases on banks have received much less attention, partially owing to the  view 
of policy makers that the main effects of QE have come through boosting asset 
prices, aggregate demand and inflation, but it is less clear whether these  improve 
the flow of  credit to the economy. The credit channel is discussed in e.g. Altavilla et 
al. (2016) for the euro area, and Joyce and Spaltro (2014) for the United Kingdom. 
Most of this literature focuses on the impact of QE in major economies, and to a 
lesser extent discusses the influence it might have on small countries participating in 
the programme. In the euro area the asset purchases are conducted on a 
decentralised basis, and thereby have a significant impact across various sectors of 
the economy. In a small open economy with a fully bank based system (i.e. with very 
limited capital markets), almost any domestic bond market transaction involves a 
bank as counterparty.6 Therefore, in this paper we deal with two main questions. 
                                           
5 A commercial bank technically receives reserves instead of cash, which are then held at the central 
bank. For a non-bank, for instance a pension fund, the deposit account is credited in exchange for 
selling government securities to the central bank. For more details, see Butt et al. (2012). 
6 The Slovak capital market is rather small and fully dominated by government bond trading (almost 
99.3%). Since corporate bonds and shares are traded in small amounts, there is rather limited room 
for portfolio rebalancing behaviour among Slovak banks. For more details, see A. Lojschová (2016). 
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First, we document the presence of the bank lending channel and second, we assess 
to what extent quantitative easing helped to boost this channel.  
The traditional approaches to the bank lending channel examine how banks' lending 
supply responds to monetary shocks which affect the level of liabilities held at the 
commercial bank. Our analysis follows a methodology originally proposed by Kashyap 
and Stein (1994). Borrowing from this literature, we investigate the relationship 
between bank lending and deposit growth. We specify this relationship in a pooled 
mean group (PMG) setup developed by Pesaran et al. (1999). To do this, we use 
individual bank-level data of 26 financial institutions operating in the Slovak banking 
sector between January 2009 and mid-2016.  
Our paper makes two main findings. First, we find a positive and significant long-run 
link between bank lending and changes in deposit ratio for the non-financial private 
sector. We show that the long-run effect for lending to households is almost twice as 
strong as for non-financial corporations. These results support the  presence of the 
bank lending channel in Slovakia, and boost for household lending; however this 
could well be caused by the reduction of the policy rate during the  period 
investigated. Even if we control for the policy rate cut, the long-run relationship still 
exists. Second, we find a significant long-run relationship between bank lending and 
deposit ratio if we include individual banks’ sales of Slovak government bonds as a 
proxy for QE purchases. This relationship is strong only for the household sector, 
supporting evidence that the asset purchase programme provided an additional 
boost mainly to lending to Slovak households.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides more details on the 
type of bank lending channel we are examining in this paper. Section 3 outlines the 
empirical framework we adopt, while Section 4 discusses the econometric results. 
The final section concludes. 
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THE BANK LENDING CHANNEL  
The possibility that monetary policy affects the real economy through credit channels 
has received considerable attention.7 While the “money view” of monetary policy 
tends to be rather narrowly focused on interest rates, the “lending view” argues that 
monetary policy actions have a direct effect on bank lending. 
For the purpose of clarity, it is useful to begin with defining what we mean by the 
bank lending channel. The central bank “creates” money when it buys government 
securities from a bank. From a balance sheet perspective, there is an increase in the 
monetary base, or reserves held by banks at the central bank plus currency in 
circulation, equal to the amount of central bank asset purchases. Banks require a 
certain amount of cash to meet daily requirements; however banks will not usually 
choose to hold excess reserves and will instead seek to make a return on it. Since 
reserves attract a low rate of interest (the deposit facility has been in negative 
territory since June 2014), banks could possibly benefit from an expansion of lending 
to the real economy, subject to their own capital constraints. 
Even if the central bank buys assets from a non-bank financial institution (for 
instance, a pension fund or an insurance corporation) this can still indirectly affect 
bank lending. When a non-bank investor sells government bonds to the central bank, 
the reserves it receives become a deposit at its commercial bank. If they do not use 
these excess reserves to invest in an alternative asset, the deposits held by the 
commercial bank expand. The bank may choose to employ these new deposits by 
expanding its credit supply to the real economy. 
Another indirect channel, which acts counter to the above, is the impact on bank 
lending through a reduction in long-term interest rates. This can lower banks’ net 
interest margins, and, if they are capital constrained, reduce their ability to lend to 
                                           
7 These channels have been discussed by a number of authors, e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (1995), 
Mishkin (1996), Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) and more recently by Di Maggio et al. (2016) 
or Ippolito et al. (2016). 
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the real economy. In terms of the impact of the bank lending channel in Slovakia, 
according to the ECB April 2016 Bank Lending Survey (BLS), some Slovak banks 
indicated they have used the funds arising from the expanded APP to support their 
credit supply to households and non-financial corporations. 
In this paper we focus on the direct balance sheet effects, i.e. the reaction of bank 
lending following changes in the stock of deposits. In order to do this, we use 
individual bank-level data of 26 financial institutions operating in the Slovak lending 
market between January 2009 and mid-2016. Figure 2 shows that the relationship 
between bank lending and deposit growth was positive (first row) and  changed after 
the QE announcement, especially for the household sector (second and third rows). 
A key challenge for our empirical work is to show that the causality runs from 
changes in deposits to changes in lending, rather than the other way around. For 
example Kumhof and Jakab (2015) argue that loans come before deposits, i.e. banks 
create deposits of new money through lending.8 The endogenous variation in 
deposits, caused by the creation of deposits when a bank extends a loan, may 
therefore risk biasing the estimation results.  
                                           
8 More specifically, in the modern banking system, whenever a bank makes a new loan to a non-bank 
customer, it creates a new loan entry on the asset side of its balance sheet, and it simultaneously 
creates a new and equal sized deposit entry on the liability side of its balance sheet. The bank 
therefore creates its own funding, deposits, in the act of lending.  
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Figure 2. Relationship between loans and deposits for top 4 banks in Slovakia 
Total Households Non-financial corporations 
Whole period: 2009-01 to 2016-06 
 
Before QE announcement 
 
After QE announcement 
 
Note: Top 4 banks cover almost 70% of the total banking sector in Slovakia. 
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EMPIRICAL APPROACH  
Our analysis of the bank lending channel follows a methodology proposed by 
Kashyap and Stein (1994). They present a two period, partial equilibrium model 
where banks must make an asset choice between holding liquid securities and 
earning a spread on lending; and a liability choice in terms of how much external 
financing they use at an increasing premium. Monetary authority is assumed to affect 
banks’ balance sheets through changes in reserves, which lead to a change in 
deposits, on the assumption that banks maintain a fixed ratio between reserves and 
deposits.9 
Borrowing from this literature, we investigate the relationship between bank lending 
and deposit growth by employing the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator developed 
by Pesaran et al. (1999). The PMG estimator is a panel data version of an error-
correction model which allows us to estimate both short and long-run dynamics.10 
This approach does not require prior specification of which variables are stationary 
I(0) or integrated of order I(1), and does not oblige all variables to be the same 
order unlike the traditional methods.11 In addition, different variables can be 
assigned different lag lengths, i.e. this representation does not require symmetry of 
lag terms.12 
The estimating equation is given by: 
 ∆𝑙𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜙𝑖(𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜃𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1) +∑𝛾𝑖,𝑡
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
∆𝑙𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 +∑𝛿𝑖,𝑡
𝑞−1
𝑗=0
∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
                                           
9 The total reserve requirements for euro area banks stand at around 113 billion euro. Banks have to 
hold a minimum of 1% of certain liabilities, mainly customers’ deposits, at their national central bank. 
10 PMG estimator constrains long-run coefficients to be the same and allows short-run coefficients and 
error variances to differ across cross-sectional units. 
11 Traditional methods of estimating co-integrating relationships, such as Engle-Granger or Johansen's 
method, or single equation methods such as OLS, or dynamic OLS either require all variables to be 
I(1), or require prior knowledge and specification of which variables are I(0) and which are I(1). 
12 Another benefit of this representation is the lag structure, which ensures a causal relationship being 
embedded directly into the specification, i.e. causality tests are not therefore necessary. 
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where 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 is annual lending growth for bank i in period t and 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of 
individual bank variables that impact bank lending activity such as deposit growth, 
change in deposits ratio (i.e. deposits over total assets) and change in capital ratio 
(i.e. capital over risk-weighted assets). We include deposit ratio in our analysis 
because it helps us to capture large changes in deposits that may lead to increases in 
assets. For example, Joyce and Spaltro (2014) found that movements in the deposit 
ratio have a positive and significant effect on bank lending. Most studies investigate 
the relationship between bank lending and how well-capitalised banks are.13 Joyce 
and Spaltro (2014) found that changes in capital have a significant, but negative, 
impact on lending growth in the first lag and long-run. As they argue, this does not 
necessarily contradict the fact that there is a positive long-run equilibrium 
relationship with the level of capital. Another possible explanatory variable, such as 
macroeconomic factors, did not prove significant for our analysis.14   
Equation (1) originates in an autoregressive distributed lag ARDL model which allows 
us to estimate both short and long-run dynamics.15 The second term in equation (1) 
represents the long-run relationship between bank lending and deposit growth and 
other explanatory variables. The PMG estimator incorporates the assumptions that 
the cross-sectional units (in our case individual banks) share the same long-run 
relationship, but differ in the short-term adjustment and dynamics around that long-
run link. The long-term coefficient 𝜃 is thus restricted to being equal for all the banks 
included in the estimation. Parameter 𝜙𝑖 is the bank-specific error-correction 
coefficient. Panel estimates of this coefficient are obtained through the mean group 
procedure by averaging over the individual bank slope estimates. The existence of a 
long-run relationship can be tested on the t-statistic of the panel mean group 
estimate of 𝜙. The third and fourth terms in equation (1) represent the bank-specific 
                                           
13 For example, Marques-Ibanez (2011) shows that the health of banks’ balance sheets, and in 
particular the amount of capital they hold, is important in determining the effectiveness of the bank 
lending channel. 
14 We have tested GDP growth, unemployment rate, and HICP inflation. 
15 In fact equation (1) is obtained by transforming an ARDL model of order p and q into first 
differences. 
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short-term dynamics, which are captured by the coefficients of the individual time 
lags 𝛾𝑖,𝑡 and 𝛿𝑖,𝑡. Panel estimates of these coefficients are also obtained through the 
mean group procedure. 
We estimate equation (1) using Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator. There are, for 
instance, different possibilities regarding how to evaluate this relationship. Some 
authors (e.g. Bond, 2002, Alessandri and Nelson, 2012) deal with this problem by 
using a GMM estimator. However, the asymptotic properties of GMM estimators are 
derived for large N and small T datasets and may not be applicable to our case. In 
order to assess the robustness of our results, we employ in our analysis the Fixed 
Effect (FE) estimators.16 Since they are similar in magnitude and significance, we 
present only the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimation results. 
                                           
16 See Annex 2 on Robustness Analysis. 
  
 
13 
DID QUANTITATIVE EASING BOOST BANK LENDING?  
THE SLOVAK EXPERIENCE. 
RESULTS  
In our analysis we use a unique data set which includes 13 Slovak banks and 13 
branches of foreign banks located in Slovakia.17 The balance sheet size of these 26 
banks amounts to over €70 billion, with deposits accounting for more than 70% of 
total liabilities and loans for around 65% of total assets.  
We start by exploring the relationship between bank lending and deposit growth 
using the whole sample of 2340 observations. We use changes in deposit ratio (i.e., 
deposits over total assets) as an explanatory variable because by construction this 
variable captures well changes in other non-deposit liabilities. As Joyce and Spaltro 
(2014) argue, by looking at this ratio, we are more likely to capture large changes in 
deposits that drive increases in assets and it is therefore closer to QE-induced 
expansion of banks’ deposits. Table 1 shows the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) 
estimation of equation (1) and confirms that there is a positive and significant long-
run link between bank lending and changes in deposit ratio for the non-financial 
private sector.18 When comparing across sectors, the long-run effect is almost twice 
as strong for the household sector as for non-financial corporations. Lending to 
insurance corporations and pension funds is rather volatile and introduces too much 
noise to be able to model it in any form.19  
 
 
 
 
                                           
17 We have included financial entities on a consolidated level, as we assume that lending decisions are 
taken on a group-level basis. For more information, see Annex 1 on data set.  
18 We find a positive and significant long-run link between bank lending and deposit growth, but as 
argued earlier we report results only for deposit ratio. 
19 The insurance corporations and pension funds (ICPFs) sector constitutes on average around 6% of 
total lending to economy. 
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Table 1. Lending growth estimation results for full sample 
Sectoral break-down 
 Lending growth                                                                                      
 
to 
households 
(HHs) 
to non-
financial 
corporations 
(NFCs) 
to insurance 
corporation and 
pension funds 
(ICPFs) 
total  
Long run          
Change in Deposit ratio 
(DR) 
  
 
 
0,48*** 0,209** -0,221 0,25** 
 (0,096) (0,087) (0,253) (0,115) 
Error correction  -0,093*** -0,18*** -0,251*** -0,119*** 
   (0,021) (0,051) (0,039) (0,038) 
Short-term dynamics          
     ∆ L1  0,305***   0,161** 0,093** 
   (0,074)   (0,075) (0,041) 
     ∆ L2  0,127**   -0,029 0,001 
   (0,060)   (0,108) (0,067) 
     ∆ DR0  -0,047* -0,044 -0,595*** -0,125* 
   (0,026) (0,098) (0,200) (0,064) 
     ∆ DR1  0,061       
   (0,064)       
Constant  0,01 -0,007 0,044 0 
   (0,008) (0,007) (0,062) (0,004) 
Number of Obs.  2340 2340 1668 2340 
Number of Banks  26 26 26 26 
Model selection  ARDL (3,2) ARDL (1,1) ARDL (3,1) ARDL (3,1) 
RMSE  0,316 0,295 0,493 0,242 
Notes: This table reports the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimation of equation (1). DR stands for 
change in deposit ratio (measured as deposit over total assets), L for lending growth, number behind DR 
or L indicates to current or lagged changes.  RMSE is the root mean squared error. Standard errors are 
shown in parentheses and ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.  
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These results might support the existence of a bank lending channel, and a boost for 
household lending; however this could well be caused by the reduction of policy rate 
during the  period investigated. Thus we re-estimate equation (1) and include the 
short-term interest rates to capture this effect. Data on individual banks’ lending 
rates suggest that successive declines in EONIA rate have been passed through to 
lending rates to a different extent across sectors (a larger decline for households 
than for corporations – see Figure 3); therefore we include the composite lending 
rate in our analysis. 
Figure 3. Developments in policy rate and composite 
lending rate  
 
Note: Composite lending rate for households and non-financial 
corporations is calculated as a weighted average of individual banks’ 
interest rates included in the sample. 
In addition, we include two dummy variables in our estimation. First, since we 
investigate the relationship between bank lending and deposit ratio during the QE 
implementation phase, we include a dummy for the post March 2015 period. Second, 
we use an additional dummy to account for changes in legislation that allowed for 
significant reduction of a fee for early repayment of mortgage loans since March 
2016, which have led to an additional boost in lending for house purchases.20  
                                           
20 For more information, see https://www.etrend.sk/trend-archiv/rok-2016/cislo-23/koho-netesia-
lacne-hypoteky.html.  
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Table 2 reports the estimation results and shows that there is a long-run relationship 
between bank lending growth and changes in deposit ratio if we control for policy 
rate cuts and include the two dummy variables. The magnitude of the long run link 
stays robust, suggesting that bank lending activity remains ample in the period 
where the short-term policy rate was constrained at its effective lower bound. When 
comparing across sectors, the long-run effect is more than twice as strong for the 
household sector than for non-financial corporations. The coefficient on composite 
lending rate is negative and significant for households and insignificant for the 
remaining sectors.21 These results further support the existence of the bank lending 
channel, and in particular a boost for household lending. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
21 Even if we include EONIA rate instead of the composite lending rate the coefficient remains 
insignificant. 
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Table 2. Lending growth estimation results if we control for policy rate cut 
Sectoral break-down 
 Lending growth                                                                                      
 
to 
households 
(HHs) 
to non-
financial 
corporations 
(NFCs) 
to insurance 
corporation 
and pension 
funds (ICPFs) 
total  
Long run          
Change in Deposit ratio 
(DR) 
  
 
 
0,556*** 0,214* -0,216 0,229** 
 (0,093) (0,095) (0,251) (0,098) 
Error correction  -0,089*** -0,173*** -0,264*** -0,111*** 
   (0,025) (0,048) (0,037) (0,038) 
Short-term dynamics          
     ∆ L1  0,264***   0,158** 0,088** 
   (0,070)   (0,076) (0,039) 
     ∆ L2  0,123**   -0,018 0,012 
   (0,062)   (0,103) (0,071) 
     ∆ DR0  -0,043 0,022 -0,593*** -0,113* 
   (0,034) (0,143) (0,204) (0,068) 
     ∆ DR1  0,038       
   (0,064)       
     ∆ DR2  -0,007***       
   (0,041)       
  ∆ Composite lending rate  -0,099*** 0,033 -0,017 -0,106*** 
   (0,024) (0,107) (0,064) (0,017) 
Constant  0,004 -0,007 0,045 -0,001 
   (0,009) (0,007) (0,063) (0,003) 
Number of Obs.  2340 2340 1668 2340 
Number of Banks  26 26 26 26 
Model selection  ARDL (3,3) ARDL (1,1) ARDL (3,1) ARDL (3,1) 
RMSE  0,351 0,725 0,496 0,240 
Notes: This table reports the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimation of equation (1). DR stands for change 
in deposit ratio (measured as deposit over total assets), L for lending growth, number behind DR or L 
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indicates to current or lagged changes.  RMSE is the root mean squared error. Standard errors are shown 
in parentheses and ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. There 
are two dummy variables included in the estimation (i) QE dummy which has 0 before the QE 
implementation phase and 1 after, and (ii) a legislation dummy which has value 0 before March 2016 and 
1 till the end of sample. 
As suggested in the previous section, we also include some micro-prudential bank 
variables, such as capital ratio (i.e. capital over risk weighted assets). As risk 
weighted assets, Tier 1 and 2 capital data were mostly available for Slovak banks 
and just a very few foreign branches; we report our results only for Slovak banks. 
Table 3 shows that a new explanatory variable – changes in capital ratio – has a 
statistically significant and negative impact on lending growth.  As argued by Joyce 
and Spaltro (2014), this does not necessarily contradict the fact that there is a 
positive long-run equilibrium relationship with the level of capital. In fact, we find a 
positive long-run link between bank lending and capital if we use them in levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
19 
DID QUANTITATIVE EASING BOOST BANK LENDING?  
THE SLOVAK EXPERIENCE. 
Table 3. Lending growth estimation results if we include micro-prudential variable 
Sectoral break-down 
Lending growth                                                                                      
to 
households 
(HHs) 
to non-
financial 
corporations 
(NFCs) 
to insurance 
corporation 
and pension 
funds (ICPFs) 
total  
Long run         
Change in Deposit ratio 
(DR) 
  
0,508*** 0,125 -0,072 0,157* 
(0,127) (0,086) (0,246) (0,082) 
Change in Capital ratio 
(CR) 
  
-0,141*** 0,182 -0,183* -0,159*** 
(0,026) (0,110) (0,070) (0,024) 
Error correction -0,081*** -0,131*** -0,303*** -0,18*** 
  (0,019) (0,042) (0,058) (0,059) 
Short-term dynamics         
 ∆  Composite lending rate -0,104*** 0,037 0,049 -0,095*** 
  (0,024) (0,101) (0,158) (0,022) 
Number of Obs. 1170 1170 834 1170 
Number of Banks 13 13 13 13 
Model selection ARDL (3,1,1) ARDL (3,3,3) ARDL (3,1,1) ARDL (4,4,4) 
RMSE 0,252 0,294 0,498 0,260 
Notes: This table reports the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimation of equation (1). DR stands for 
change in deposit ratio (measured as deposit over total assets), CR for change in capital ratio (measured 
as Tier 1 and 2 capital over risk weighted assets).  RMSE is the root mean squared error. Standard 
errors are shown in parentheses and ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. There are two dummy variables included in estimation (i) QE dummy which has 0 before 
the QE implementation phase and 1 after, and (ii) legislation dummy which has value 0 before March 
2016 and 1 till the end of sample.  
To save space, we do not report all short-term coefficients. 
Our results suggest that there is a positive and significant link between bank lending 
and deposit ratio if we control for policy rate cut and include micro-prudential 
variables. Using our proxy series for QE participation (sovereign bond transactions), 
we test whether such long-run link holds also for QE-induced deposits. Table 4 
reports these findings.  
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Table 4. Lending growth estimation results if we include proxy for QE purchases 
Sectoral break-down 
Lending growth                                                                                      
to 
households 
(HHs) 
to non-
financial 
corporations 
(NFCs) 
to insurance 
corporation 
and pension 
funds 
(ICPFs) 
total  
Long run         
Change in Deposit ratio 
(DR) 
0,446*** 0,042*** 0,022*** 0,046*** 
  (0,065) (0,013) (0,032) (0,005) 
Change in Capital ratio 
(CR) 
0,144*** -0,202*** -0,553*** 0,026** 
  (0,012) (0,049) (0,104) (0,011) 
 Change in SK govies 0,031*** -0,011 0,084 0,002 
  (0,007) (0,008) (0,053) (0,001) 
Error correction -0,151* -0,262*** 0,266*** -0,129 
  (0,079) (0,097) (0,080) (0,092) 
Short-term dynamics         
 ∆  Composite lending rate -0,005 -0,061 0,048 -0,211** 
  (0,092) (0,162) (0,048) (0,080) 
Number of Obs. 858 858 704 858 
Number of Banks 13 13 13 13 
Model selection ARDL (2,1,1,1) ARDL (2,2,2,2) ARDL (3,1,1,1) ARDL (2,2,2,2) 
RMSE 0,160 0,165 0,559 0,140 
Notes: This table reports the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimation of equation (1). DR stands for change 
in deposit ratio (measured as deposit over total assets), CR for change in capital ratio (measured as Tier 1 
and 2 capital over risk weighted assets).  RMSE is the root mean squared error. Standard errors are 
shown in parentheses and ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
There are two dummy variables included in estimation (i) QE dummy which has 0 before the QE 
implementation phase and 1 after, and (ii) legislation dummy which has value 0 before March 2016 and 1 
till the end of sample.  
To save space, we do not report all short-term coefficients. 
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These results suggest that after backing out all other eventual effects from the 
lending channel, we are still left with a significant positive effect of quantitative 
easing on lending to the household sector in Slovakia. Indeed, the self-reported 
evidence from the ECB Bank Lending Survey (BLS) confirms this view.22 In particular, 
some Slovak banks indicated that they have used the funds arising from the 
expanded APP to support their credit supply to households and non-financial 
corporations. While Slovak banks and foreign branches have provided more new 
loans to the household sector, lending to corporates was on a declining trend from 
mid-2015, although experiencing some recovery in recent months. New lending to 
households has held more robustly, and has indeed increased since the QE 
announcement.  
                                           
22 The bank lending survey (BLS) for the euro area was launched in 2003 and the sample group 
comprises around 140 banks from all euro area countries (5 banks from Slovakia). Since October 
2015, the BLS includes ad hoc questions related to the impact of the ECB’s expanded asset purchase 
programme (APP). 
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CONCLUSION  
The effects of large asset purchases on banks have received much less attention, 
partially owing to the  view of policy makers that the main effects of QE have come 
through boosting asset prices, aggregate demand and inflation, but it is less clear 
whether it improves the flow of  credit to the economy. The bank lending channel 
can be understood as a supplementary channel of monetary policy which leads banks 
to increase their supply of lending. In a small country with less effective capital 
markets – such as Slovakia – the bank lending channel may in fact be the primary 
transmission channel of QE. 
In this paper we examine whether and to what extent the ECB asset purchases gave 
rise to a bank lending channel in Slovakia. We use individual bank-level data on 26 
financial institutions operating in the Slovak banking sector between January 2009 
and June 2016. We see the value added of this paper in  two main areas. First, we 
found a positive and significant long-run link between bank lending and changes in 
deposit ratio for the non-financial private sector. We show that the long-run effect 
for lending to households is almost twice as strong as for non-financial corporations. 
These results support the presence of the bank lending channel in Slovakia, and a 
boost for household lending, also when controlling for dynamics in retail interest 
rates and other possible factors.  Second, we found a significant long-run relationship 
between deposit ratio and bank lending if we include individual banks’ sales of Slovak 
government bonds as a proxy for QE purchases. This relationship is positive only for 
the household sector, supporting evidence of an additional boost from the asset 
purchase programme to lending to Slovak households.  
Since the purchases under the PSPP programme are expected to run until the end of 
2017 or in any case until  inflation returns to a path consistent with the ECB’s 
objective, this paper provides an early assessment of the local impact of the 
programme.  
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ANNEX 1: THE DATA SET 
In our analysis we make use of a unique bank-level data set which covers balance 
sheet and interest rate data for all credit institutions located in Slovakia. We have 
included financial entities at a consolidated level, as we assume that lending 
decisions are taken on a group-level basis. This sample includes 13 Slovak banks 
(predominantly foreign-owned) and 13 branches of foreign banks located in Slovakia 
(see Table 5) and is therefore highly representative of aggregate and of cross-
sectional patterns. For comparison, most of the empirical studies for the euro area 
include only the three biggest significant institutions from Slovakia and thus do not 
have full representation of the Slovak banking sector. 
Table 5. List of financial institutions 
Slovak banks  Branches of foreign banks located in 
Slovakia 
Všeobecná úverová banka, a.s.  UniCredit Bank Czech Republic and Slovakia, a.s. 
Slovenská sporiteľňa, a.s.  Komerční banka, a.s. 
Tatra banka, a.s.  Citibank Europe plc 
Slovenská  záručná a rozvojová banka, a.s.  ING Bank N.V. 
Sberbank Slovensko, a.s.  COMMERZBANK Aktiengesellschaft 
OTP Banka Slovensko, a.s.  Banco Banif  Mais, S.A. 
Prima banka Slovensko, a.s.  J&T BANKA, a.s. 
Prvá stavebná sporiteľna, a.s.  Fio banka, a.s. 
Poštová banka, a.s.  mBank S.A.  
Wüstenrot stavebná sporiteľňa, a.s.  Oberbank AG  
Privatbanka, a.s.  ZUNO BANK AG 
ČSOB stavebná sporiteľňa, a.s.  BKS Bank AG 
Československá obch. banka, a.s.  KDB Bank Europe Ltd. 
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From the data set called Individual Balance Sheet Indicators, or IBSI, reporting the 
main asset and liability items of 26 banks resident in Slovakia from January 2009 to 
mid-2016, we obtain data on the amount of outstanding loans, deposits (with further 
sectoral breakdown into households, non-financial corporations, insurance 
corporations and pension funds) and the exposures to sovereign debt (with detailed 
information on issuer, maturity, ISIN code and type of portfolio such as held to 
maturity (HTM), available for sale (AFS), and held for trade (HFT).23 We construct a 
series where the decline/increase in stock of domestic sovereign bond holdings 
would serve as a proxy of purchase/sale of assets related to QE. Since a 
decline/increase in stock may as well refer to maturing debt/new emission, this effect 
is backed out from the series.24  
The second data set, called Individual Monetary and Financial Institution Interest 
Rates or IMIR, contains information on individual deposits and lending rates charged 
by banks for different maturities and for different loan sizes. In addition, we 
incorporate in our analysis the micro-prudential bank variables coming from 
FINREP/COREP data set. Since the variables for capital adequacy (Tier 1 and 2), risk 
weighted assets (RWAs), non-performing loans (NPL) and return on assets (RoA) 
were only available for Slovak banks and just a very few foreign branches, we report 
our results only for Slovak banks.  
                                           
23 Monthly report V86 contains data on issuer, maturity, ISIN code, type of portfolio (HTM, AFS, HFT) 
etc. These data have been available since January 2012. 
24 For example in February 2016, two major Slovak banks recorded a steep decline in domestic 
sovereign bond holdings which was associated with maturing of Slovak 6-year government bonds. 
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ANNEX 2: ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
In order to assess the robustness of our results, we report the Fixed Effect (FE) 
estimations of the relationship between bank lending and changes to deposit ratio. 
Table 6 shows estimation results of the short and long-term dynamics across 
different specifications for the non-financial private sector. 25,26  
The FE estimation results confirm the main findings of our paper, and in particular 
that we find a positive and significant long-run link between bank lending and 
changes in deposit ratio for the non-financial private sector. The magnitude and 
significance of the short- and long-term coefficients are comparable with PMG 
estimations results reported in Tables 2-4. It still holds that the long-run effect for 
lending to households is almost twice as strong as for non-financial corporations. If 
we include individual banks’ sales of Slovak government bonds as a proxy for QE 
purchases, we find a significant long-run relationship only for the household sector, 
documenting some, although limited, evidence of the presence of the bank lending 
channel of asset purchases for the household sector. Changes in capital ratio have a 
statistically significant and negative impact only for the household sector, and are 
insignificant for the non-financial sector. The composite lending rate is negative and 
significant for all three household sector specifications as for the PMG estimations. All 
in all, the FE results support the conclusions of our preliminary assessment of large 
scale asset purchases on bank lending activity in Slovakia. 
 
 
 
                                           
25 The short-run effect is captured by the coefficients of the individual time lags, while the cumulative 
long-run effect is defined by the sum of the lagged coefficients divided by one minus the sum of the 
lagged lending coefficients. 
26 As lending to insurance corporations and pension funds is somewhat volatile and introduces too 
much noise into our estimations, we present results only for lending to households and non-financial 
corporations. 
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Table 6. Fixed Effect estimators results 
Sectoral break-down 
Lending growth                                                                                      
to households (HHs)  
to non-financial 
corporations (NFCs) 
Specification  Table 2 Table 3 Table 4  Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 
Long-run               
Change in Deposit ratio 
(DR) 
  
0,549** 0,51** 0,361*  0,236** 0,169 0,535 
(0,045) (0,257) (0,381)  (0,032) (0,239) (0,672) 
Change in Capital ratio 
(CR) 
  
- -0,028* -0,041  - -0,018 -0,005 
  (0,016) (0,029)    (0,017) (0,023) 
 Change in SK govies - - 0,014*  - - 0,047 
      (0,798)      (0,057) 
Short-term dynamics              
 ∆  Composite lending 
rate 
  
-0,182*** -0,188*** -0,314***  -0,001 -0,001 -0,007 
(0,024) (0,023) (0,041)  (0,003) (0,003) (0,026) 
Number of Obs. 2340 1170 858  2340 1170 858 
Number of Banks 26 13 13  26 13 13 
RMSE 0,206 0,206 0,224  0,207 0,208 0,201 
Notes: This table reports the Fixed Effect (FE) estimation of equation (1). RMSE is the root mean 
squared error. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and ***, ** and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. There are two dummy variables included in estimation (i) QE 
dummy which has 0 before the QE implementation phase and 1 after, and (ii) legislation dummy which 
has value 0 before March 2016 and 1 till the end of sample. For space reason, we do not report all 
short-term coefficients. 
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